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Abstract. In this paper I aim at explaining how analytic philosophical theology devel-
oped into a thriving field of research. In doing so, I place analytic philosophical the-
ology into a larger intellectually narrative that is deeply influenced by the philosophy 
of Enlightenment. This larger framework shows that analytic philosophical theology 
aims at providing answers to concerns raised by a philosophical tradition that shaped 
fundamentally the making of our modern Western secular world.
Keywords: analytic philosophical theology; evidentialist objection; verificationism; 
reformed epistemology; the rationality of religious belief.
Introduction
Analytic theology is an outgrowth of analytic philosophy of religion. Often 
both terms are used interchangeably; there is no clear conceptual differ-
entiation to hand, and it seems insignificant to demand one. The transi-
tion from analytic philosophy of religion to analytic theology is fluid. One 
might say that, as a discipline, analytic theology uses the methodology of 
analytic philosophy to address issues pertaining explicitly to theology. For 
reasons of simplicity I will only speak of analytic philosophical theology 
when no specific distinction between philosophy and theology is required.
Toward Analytic Theology: An Itinerary
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My thesis is that analytic theology is the most recent stage of a contin-
uous intellectual debate – one might also say the next natural step – whose 
development stems from the analytic tradition of the 1950s (see Pouviet 
2011).1
However, a proper understanding requires stepping farther back yet, 
because prominent strands of thought in the analytic tradition can only ac-
curately be understood in the light of issues originating at the beginning of 
modern Western philosophy. Thus, I place the development of analytic phil-
osophical theology into a larger narrative. This approach is aimed to show 
that analytic philosophical theology is by no means the whimsical invention 
of religiously partisan philosophers in the second half of the 20th century. 
Rather, it is the outflow of, and response to, a powerful philosophical tradi-
tion that played a crucial role in shaping the modern Western secular world.
Some philosophers and theologians might find such an approach sur-
prising, for one of the many objections against analytic thought is precisely 
its supposed a-historicity. As I shall argue, however, this is a substantial 
oversimplification which stands in need of revision. For a comprehensive 
picture of analytic philosophical theology I think that a formalist charac-
terization in terms of style and method must be supplemented with a nar-
rative that points out why many proponents of a philosophical tradition 
that was known for its predominately anti-metaphysical and anti-theolog-
ical origins have begun to conduct discussions about religion.
My argument proceeds in five steps:
First: I begin with the Vienna Circle and the verificationist criterion of 
meaning, which in principle prevents any substantial philosophical discus-
sion of religious topics.
Second: I discuss how the verificationist criterion died the silent end 
of a philosophical idea that proved to be untenable and how, in a parallel 
1 The history of philosophy is a tricky business, based inevitably on simplifications. There 
are studies showing that what is now called analytic philosophical theology is not a gen-
uinely Anglo-American product but that discussions on religion, logic, and language are 
to be found in the “Cracow-circle” in Poland in the 1930s. The tragedy of WWII led to an 
abrupt end of this movement, however. The postwar work of the Polish-Swiss Dominican 
Józef Bochenski is a later fruit of these prewar thoughts. 
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process from the 1950s onward, philosophers interested in religion started 
to reflect on the peculiarities of religious language. The infancy of analytic 
philosophical theology was party to a lively debate about the logic of re-
ligious language, which was additionally spurred on by the publication of 
Wittgenstein’s later writings.
Third: In what we might think of as its adolescence, analytic philosoph-
ical theology was primarily concerned with epistemological topics in the 
1960s to 1980s. A proper understanding of this concern requires reference 
to Locke and Kant, because their proposals for rationally justifying reli-
gious belief acted as foils against which analytic philosophers of religion 
argued.
Fourth: From the late 1980s onward, analytic philosophical theology 
attained maturity. It bore witness to a proliferation of questions – epis-
temological, logical, metaphysical and ethical – pertaining to religious 
thought. A natural consequence of this proliferation has been the increas-
ing occupation with topics lying at the heart of (Christian) theological 
doctrine.
Fifth: I conclude by commenting briefly on various criticisms raised 
against analytic philosophical theology.
1. The prehistory: Logical Positivism
In August 1929 a group of philosophers and scientists in Vienna went 
public with a manifesto dedicated to what the authors called a “scientific 
conception of the world” (Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung 1929). This 
conception was based on the idea that a statement is meaningful only 
if it is either empirically verifiable or logically necessary. Consequently, 
there is a sharp distinction between the following two kinds of statements: 
Empirical statements on the one hand, and metaphysical and theological 
statements on the other. Logical analysis reveals that the meaning of the 
former is expressed by the reduction of complex concepts to basic ones 
referring directly to empirical data. As for the latter said the manifesto, 
logical analysis reveals that they lack any clear meaning, because neither 
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a reduction to precise empirically grounded basic concepts is available nor 
are they logically necessary Accordingly, only empirical statements refer 
to genuinely theoretical content and are about reality; metaphysical and 
theological statements, by contrast, may express “only” an existential atti-
tude towards life. As such they have meaning in the sense of being able to 
influence one’s feelings, beliefs, or behavior but not in the sense of being 
true or false.
This sketchy characterization suffices to disclose the devastating con-
sequences of the scientific conception on metaphysical and theological 
thoughts. Such thoughts neither state facts that can ultimately be verified 
(or falsified) by sensory experience, nor do they explicate the meaning of 
concepts and propositions. They are cognitively meaningless pseudo-state-
ments according to the proposed verificationist criterion of meaning by 
logical analysis.
This result is nicely illustrated by Carnap’s The Elimination of Metaphys-
ics Through Logical Analysis of Language. After attempting to analyze the 
concept “God”, he draws the following conclusion:
To be sure, it often looks as though the word “God” had a meaning even in 
metaphysics. But the definitions which are set up prove on closer inspection to 
be pseudo-definitions. They lead either to logically illegitimate combinations 
of words […] or to other metaphysical words […] but in no case to the truth 
conditions of its elementary sentences (Carnap 1932/1959,  66).
He closes the paragraph as follows:
The alleged statements of metaphysics which contain such words have no 
sense, assert nothing, are mere pseudo-statements (Carnap 1932/1959, 67).
It is no wonder that this intellectual climate of the so-called logical posi-
tivist movement was no fertile soil for any form of philosophy of religion. 
It is hard to imagine a harsher verdict on religious assertions than that 
they are not only false but utterly meaningless. Since this verdict applied 
not only to a specific system of religious thought (say, a particularly su-
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perstitious version of theistic popular belief) or to a determinate class of 
religious sentences (say, Scriptural verses openly advocating brutal vio-
lence against innocent people) but unanimously to all religious assertions 
whatsoever, an effective defense against this attack was hardly available 
from the standpoint of religion itself. Any serious analytic philosophical 
theology could not even get off the ground as long as the verificationist 
criterion of meaning was widely accepted.
2. Infancy: The demise of the verificationist  
criterion of meaning
Things changed quickly, however, once the verificationist criterion came 
more and more under attack. The reasons for the rising unpopularity of this 
criterion are manifold: On the one hand, it became obvious that no satis-
factory concept of empirical verifiability could be established. As a conse-
quence, no clear criterion for distinguishing meaningful from meaningless 
statements was available. One the other hand, the verificationist criterion 
was observed to be so strict as to be directed against unsuspicious com-
mon scientific statements as well, thus making science itself impossible 
(Hempel 1950).2 Finally, advocates of so-called ordinary language philos-
ophy argued that the verificationist criterion ignores that meaningful lin-
guistic expressions are not confined to descriptive statements alone but 
include imperative, interrogative or performative utterances as well.3
Simultaneously, philosophers interested in religion took up the chal-
lenge posed by logical positivism. Particularly telling in this context is 
a controversy on “theology and falsification” which took place in the Ox-
ford journal University in 1950/51 and was reprinted in New Essays in Philo-
sophical Theology (Flow and MacIntyre 1955). The initial impulse came from 
2 Hempel argued that the verifiability criterion implies that universal generalizations are 
not meaningful. Thus, the proposed criterion eliminates the formulation of general laws, 
which is a primary aim of scientific research. 
3 It might be noted that these criticisms are purely philosophical and that some of them 
even stem from thinkers sympathetic to the positivist movement, such as Hempel. 
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Anthony Flew, who presented the following parable (originally going back 
to a tale of John Wisdom): Two men discover a garden in the deep jungle. 
One man, the believer, is convinced that a gardener planted the garden; 
his friend, the skeptic, disagrees. They decide to find out who is right and 
set a watch. No gardener is seen; even after guarding the garden with all 
imaginable detection devices, no trace of a gardener was observed. As a re-
sult, the sceptic comes to the firm conclusion that there is no gardener; the 
believer, however, sticks to his belief that this garden is evidence of a gar-
dener, but adds the qualification that the gardener apparently is invisible, 
intangible, scientifically undetectable and elusive. For Flew this parable 
shows that “a fine brush hypothesis may thus be killed by inches, the death 
by a thousand qualifications.” (Flew 1955, 97).
According to Flew, this is a particular danger for theological state-
ments. They start as assertions about God’s plan for the world or God’s 
love for creation. However, there are no clear criteria at hand indicating 
what would count as their falsification. What would falsify the statement 
that “p exists as an invisible, intangible, scientifically undetectable and 
elusive being”, but not the statement that “p does not exist at all”? The 
difference between them seems to be eliminated, since the qualifications 
in the former statement make it apparently compatible with (almost) any 
state of affairs.
R. M. Hare responds to Flew with a parable of his own (Hare 1955): 
A student is convinced that all dons plan to murder him. Moreover, all 
attempts by the student’s friends to show that his conviction is baseless 
fail. The student interprets the friendly behavior of the various dons intro-
duced to him as a particularly sophisticated plan to think himself safe so 
that the plan to murder him can be carried out even more easily. Hare uses 
this parable to argue that religious belief should not be treated as a kind of 
explanatory hypothesis as Flew suggests with his use of the parable. Rather, 
religious belief expresses what Hare calls a blik, which means roughly the 
way in which a person fundamentally looks at reality. The poor student 
has a certain blik at reality because he experiences the dons of his college 
as a threat for his personal safety. Even though there is no way to verify 
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or falsify a blik, it makes a huge difference which blik a person adopts – as 
the parable illustrates. There are more and less adequate bliks, and it is 
important to have an adequate one.
B. Mitchell, another respondent to Flew, counters Flew with yet an-
other parable (Mitchell 1955, 103–104). He imagines that, one night, 
a member of a resistance army meets a stranger who deeply impresses 
him. The stranger says that he belongs to the resistance army too, and is 
even one of its commanders. The stranger tells the partisan to trust him 
no matter what happens, and the partisan is utterly convinced that the 
stranger is loyal, sincere and upright. They meet again and again but it is 
difficult to makes sense of the stranger’s overall behavior: Sometimes he 
fights on the side of the resistance army, and sometimes he is seen with 
members of the occupying force. Sometimes the stranger provides the 
help asked for, sometimes he fails to reply even though the resistance 
forces are in a most difficult situation.
The partisan does not allow anything to count decisively against his 
belief that the stranger is not on the side of the resistance army, because 
he is committed to his promise to trust the stranger. However, it is utterly 
clear to him that the stranger’s behavior is ambiguous. He understands 
why some of his partisan friends refuse to collaborate with the stranger, 
namely because they fear that in reality he works for the occupation army’s 
secret service.
Mitchell uses this parable to illustrate several claims. First, religious be-
lief is based on a positive encounter with the divine. Second, this encounter 
gives rise to an attitude of trusting God, which, however, is subject to doubt 
and open to criticisms. Thus, theological utterances are assertions after all 
and there is plenty of evidence against the (central Christian) assertion that 
a good and loving God exists – just think of the problems of evil and divine 
hiddenness to which Mitchell alludes in his parable. Third, the believer 
trusting God will not allow such evidence to count decisively against his be-
lief. However, fourth, at one point – which is hard to predict – the evidence 
against God might become so strong that the believer’s trust dissipates or 
becomes a mere vacuous formula which ceases to influence his life.
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In his reply to Mitchell, Flew admits that theologians usually accept the 
view that many reasons speak against the believer’s commitment to trust 
God but that they nevertheless insist “that there is – there must be – some 
explanation which will show that, in spite of appearances, there really is 
a God who loves us.” (Flew 1955, 107).
For Flew, this kind of reply is ultimately a failure; the reason is simply 
that God is very unlike a human being. Mitchell’s partisan can reasonably 
explain the stranger’s ambiguous behavior by saying that the stranger does 
not know the real situation of the resistance army, that he lacks the power 
to help, etc. This response is not open to the theologian, however, for God 
is supposed to be omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect. Thus, the 
theologian “will have to resort to the avoiding action of qualification. And 
there lies the danger of that death by a thousand qualifications […].” (Flew 
1955, 107).
This delineation of the debate suffices to pick out two important points 
for our discussion:
First, Hare and Mitchell stress the fundamental difference between 
theological and scientific discourse. Theological discourse is not concerned 
primarily with explanation but rather with giving voice to a certain “form of 
life”. In other words, they argue that language has another function beside 
describing and explaining: an essential function of religious language in 
particular is to express a person’s commitment to trust a God even though 
this God remains strange and incomprehensible to us in many respects.
When the discussion in University took place, Wittgenstein’s Philo-
sophical Investigations were not published yet.4 It must not be overlooked, 
however, that the aim of liberating our understanding of language from 
the strictures of verificationism was already “in the air”. Hare’s concept of 
a blik has structural similarities with Wittgenstein’s notion of a language 
game. The student in Hare’s parable perceives the world from within his 
blik, similarly to the way in which a person is within her language game 
and her corresponding form of life. Of course, a radical interpretation of 
4 The first publication was in 1953 together with G.E.M. Anscombe’s translation into English. 
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Wittgenstein’s language game leads to some form of linguistic pluralism or 
relativism, for we end up with many incommensurable language games and 
no external method for evaluating their adequacy. One need not go this far, 
however; for, as Mitchell argues, religious belief is neither above criticism 
nor beyond rational argumentation; on the contrary, it makes good sense 
to assume that there are reasons for and against one’s religious belief.
Second, a careful reading of Flew’s reply to Hare and Mitchell shows 
that his discussion goes in a rather traditional direction. Flew’s main argu-
ment emphasizes that theological discourse ought to be interpreted real-
istically (against Hare’s blik proposal), but (against Mitchell) the classical 
divine attributes seem to offer few explanations help for responding to 
the criticisms raised against belief in God. Flew’s claim is no longer that 
theological assertions per se are meaningless; rather they are seen to be 
false: In light of all the evil in the world, an assertion like “God is our loving 
father” appears to be false.
To summarize: The search for the verificationist criterion of meaning 
receded, with the criterion itself, into gradual oblivion. Unsurprisingly, 
the decline of logical positivism in the 1950s had a liberating effect for the 
development of analytic philosophical theology. The charge that its asser-
tions are meaningless lost its intimidating force. From then on one had to 
argue about the truth or falsity of religious statements by giving reasons; 
a simple remark that such statements are devoid of any cognitive meaning 
was no longer accepted.
Nicholas Wolterstorff remarks in a recent article (Wolterstorff 2009) 
that the demise of logical positivism had another far-reaching effect as 
well: A main strand of modern philosophy was occupied with the question 
of delineating the knowable from the non-knowable: Think, for instance, of 
Descartes’s project to delineate the dubitable from the indubitable, Hume’s 
skepticism about supposedly true propositions about immediate sense im-
pressions, or of Kant’s investigation of the boundaries between the phe-
nomenal and the noumenal. Verificationism can be seen as another such 
project of delineation. Its ultimate failure had the consequence that “deep 
skepticism reigns among analytic philosophers concerning all grand pro-
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posals for demarcating the thinkable from the unthinkable, the assertible 
from the non-assertible.” (Wolterstorff 2009, 157).
That philosophers have ceased to be concerned with the search for such 
a demarcation is, according to Wolterstorff, among the primary reasons 
why philosophical theology has begun to flourish in the analytic tradition.
3. The historical context of analytic philosophical theology
Wolterstorff’s hint is worthy of further investigation, for it helps us under-
stand the larger stream of thought in which analytic philosophical theology 
is embedded. This stream of thought brings us back to the late 17th century 
and the 18th century (Wolterstorff 1996; Wolterstorff 2010). In order to 
see the importance of the philosophical ideas developed in that time for 
thinking about religion in subsequent centuries, it behoves us to compare 
them with the heyday of philosophical thinking about religion: medieval 
philosophical theology. In medieval times, philosophical and theological 
thinking was text-based. There was a traditional and continuously growing 
canon of philosophical and theological literature which each generation 
of scholars had to study and comment on. Although various schools de-
veloped at different universities, monasteries and religious orders, and 
dissonances and inconsistencies in the literature under investigation were 
recognized; this diversity of views concerning the hermeneutical challeng-
es of understanding the texts was not regarded as anything threatening. 
Rather, the growing body of literature on those texts was largely seen as 
a single source of one and same wisdom which carefully had to be extract-
ed. Wolterstorff notes:
Of course, it was recognized that there were heresies, errors, and disputed 
questions; […]. Nonetheless, the conviction remained that if one assigned the 
proper priorities among the texts (with the Bible being preeminent), selected 
the right senses, used the appropriate strategies of interpretation, and made 
the right distinctions, a richly articulated body of truth would come to light. 
St. Paul and Virgil, Aristotle and Augustine, would all be seen to fit together 
(Wolterstorff 1996, 2).
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In the late 17th century the situation was altogether different: Europe was 
highly fragmented, both politically and religiously. Fierce wars destroyed 
large areas in France, Germany and England. Europe was divided not only 
between Catholics and Protestants, but Protestantism itself was fragment-
ed into smaller and often antagonistic groups many of which fought each 
other. In effect, a series of religious wars over the right interpretation of 
texts and traditions was taking place. In such a situation of religious, moral 
and intellectual crisis, the idea of one unified body of knowledge handed 
down by one unified tradition as basis for a common understanding was 
no longer credible. There was no one unified tradition anymore but many 
different mutually exclusive traditions. Thus, it is no surprise that intellec-
tuals sought another basis which could serve as a common starting point of 
discussion acceptable by and accessible to every rational person.
Locke was among these intellectuals. For him this situation of frag-
mentation and conflict was a symptom of the deeper problem: People 
unreflectively defend their own particular tradition, rather than further 
investigating whether their defense is justified (Conduct, § 10, 10–18). 
To overcome this deplorable situation, people must follow the voice of 
reason by aiming to discover the fundamental and substantial truths upon 
which all others are based. Locke writes:
There are fundamental truths that lie at the bottom, the base that a great many 
others rest on and are held together by. These are teeming with content with 
which they furnish the mind, and—like the lights of heaven—are not only beau-
tiful and entertaining in themselves but bring to light other things that without 
them couldn’t be seen or known. An example is Newton’s admirable discovery 
that all bodies gravitate towards one another, which may be counted as the 
basis of natural philosophy. He has astonished the learned world by showing 
how much this helps us to understand the great frame of our solar system; we 
don’t yet know how much further it would guide us in other things if rightly 
pursued (Conduct, § 43). 
What Locke proposes is a version of classical foundationalism: The accep-
tance of a certain belief should depend on fundamental beliefs whose truth 
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is certain or (at least) very probably true. This procedure holds not only for 
knowledge of the natural world but also of religion. Although Locke thinks 
that our minds are narrow, prone to mistakes and capable of grasping rel-
atively few truths, he is no skeptic, for he thinks that every rationally en-
dowed creature has the capacity to grasp the fundamental religious truths. 
He remarks:
The works of nature and the words of revelation display it to mankind in char-
acters so large and visible that those who aren’t entirely blind can read them 
and see the first principles and most necessary parts of theology; and from 
there they may be able—time and energy permitting—to go on to the more ab-
struse parts of it, and penetrate into those infinite depths filled with treasures 
of wisdom and knowledge (Conduct, § 23, 12–20).
Locke takes it to be our duty as rational beings to thoroughly assess wheth-
er a believed divine revelation is really of divine origin or is merely an illu-
sion, and says that the tool for doing so is reason. Locke is confident that 
any divine revelation is evidentially embedded; that is, that the revelation 
is not immediately directed to the addressee but rather is mediated by 
corresponding evidence which the addressee can employ reason to assess. 
Locke states:
[…] no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent 
due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because 
this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evi-
dence, and assent whatsoever (Essay, IV, xviii, 5).
He continues that
reason is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may, in consenting with 
it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can 
we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentience of reason, to 
quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith […] 
(Essay, IV, xviii, 6).
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And he concludes:
Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good 
man, pass for a sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose 
their opinions or religion by (Essay, IV, xviii, 11).
These few passages from Locke lay open the foundationalist thrust of his 
argument. Religious beliefs are not of the sort to form a part of the basis 
of our system of justified beliefs. Religious beliefs are higher-order – they 
belong to the upper levels of our belief-system and are therefore in need 
of support by self-evident or clear and evident to the senses non-religious 
beliefs in the epistemic basis. The ideal is a system of justified true beliefs 
based on beliefs in propositions that are accessible to all people who use 
their faculties of reason in an appropriate and unbiased way. This basis 
provides us with a secure position from which to begin to investigate other 
issues on which reason has a less firm grasp – such as religious matters. 
Thus, Locke’s proposal is the ideal of a rationally grounded religion (Wol-
terstorff 2010, 23).
This view overlaps to a good extent with Kant’s own ideal, derived from 
his analysis of possible human experience and knowledge. According to 
Kant, anything outside the realm of our experience, that is, outside space 
and time as the two pure forms of our intuition, is beyond our ability to 
know. We can have no cognition (“Erkenntnis”) of supersensible entities; 
thus any knowledge of entities like God or an (immaterial) soul is unavail-
able to us. It is important to underline that Kant does not think that we 
are unable to reflect in a sensible manner about the supersensible. We 
can form ideas about it and we can check whether these are construed 
consistently and coherently. Thus, the challenge is not that religious (or 
metaphysical) doctrines are unintelligible because they refer to the su-
persensible. Rather, the problem is that our thinking about this realm has 
no foothold in our experience and thus that we lack any clear methods for 
adjudicating between competing ideas. We cannot sensibly claim to have 
cognition of God or have witnessed a miracle, because we have no means 
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to test the veracity of claims about entities outside space and time. Nev-
ertheless, Kant underlines that human reason has a natural inclination to 
transcend its boundaries of experience, because it only finds peace once it 
arrives at a self-subsisting systematic outlook. He writes:
Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in experi-
ence, to venture to the outermost bounds of all cognition by means of mere 
ideas in a pure use, and to find peace only in the completion of its circle in 
a self-subsisting systematic whole.5
Kant contends that it is natural and perhaps even rationally inevitable 
to postulate supersensible entities which serve as capstones for ultimate 
and complete explanations of a given subject matter. The possible accep-
tance of such entities neither qualifies as knowledge (as indicated above); 
nor does it fall under a weaker form of assent, opinion (“Meinung”), for it 
is based upon the weighing of evidential and theoretical reasons for and 
against their truth.
However, Kant acknowledges a third mode of holding-to-be-true (“Für-
wahrhalten”), which is faith. Faith is justified assent, though its justifica-
tion is different from knowledge and opinion, for it is not rooted in expe-
rience and theoretical considerations but in the needs of practical reason. 
The idea is that, within the realm of theoretical reason, speculations about 
supersensible entities are possible but lack any rationally appropriate cri-
terion of evaluation; in the realm of practical reason, by contrast, direction 
and guidance is provided by pragmatic needs. Kant writes:
When I compare all the transcendental Ideas […] to produce the thing (be it 
knowledge or fiction) called metaphysics, I think I perceive that the aim of this 
natural tendency is, to free our notions from the fetters of experience and from 
the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so far as at least to open to us 
a field containing mere objects for the pure understanding, which no sensibil-
ity can reach, not indeed for the purpose of speculatively occupying ourselves 
with them (for there we can find no ground to stand on), but because practical 
5 Critique of Pure Reason (A797/B825). 
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principles, which, without finding some such scope for their necessary expecta-
tion and hope, could not expand to the universality which reason unavoidably 
requires from a moral point of view (Prolegomena § 60).
It is not theoretical but practical reason which justifies us in assuming an 
objective reality of ideas that transcend our experience; this assumption 
takes the form of postulates which make it reasonable to think that the high-
est good, a synthesis of morality and happiness, will obtain. As finite moral 
agents living under the obligation of the moral law we face the needs of prac-
tical reason, whose objective structure can be known by adequate reflection.6
I would like to underline two points of particular importance for our 
discussion: First, rationally grounded belief – faith – is epistemologically 
rooted in the architecture of man’s practical reason. Second, metaphysics 
is not conceived of as a field of research about the external world but rather 
as one about the rules and operations of reason which structure the mental 
objects which the external world causes us to entertain.
The impact of Locke’s and Kant’s accounts of how to ground religion 
in reason can hardly be underestimated. Locke’s argument that religious 
beliefs ought to be grounded in evidence developed later on into what 
is now known as the evidentialist objection to religious belief, that is, 
the view that one ought to proportion the strength of one’s belief to the 
evidence one has for that belief. Failure to do so is dishonest and im-
moral, amounting to a neglect of one’s epistemic duties as W. K. Clifford 
famously argued by claiming that “[…] it is wrong always, everywhere, 
and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” (Clifford 
1901/1999, 273). 
6 Kant makes explicit that the postulates are not a product of mere wishful thinking but 
rather are necessary requirements of a practical perspective. See, for instance, the Cri-
tique of Practical Reason 143 (Of Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason): “Now the 
above-mentioned postulates concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions of the 
possibility of the summum bonum; in a word, those which lie in the nature of things; not, 
however, for the sake of an arbitrary speculative purpose, but of a practically necessary 
end of a pure rational will, which in this case does not choose, but obeys an inexorable 
command of reason, the foundation of which is objective, in the constitution of things as 
they must be universally judged by pure reason, and is not based on inclination; […].”
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For Locke it was still natural to think that respecting evidence leads 
you to rationally confirmed religious beliefs; in a largely secularized intel-
lectual climate, however, the starting conditions are utterly different. Then 
it is a small step to demand that respecting one’s epistemic duties in the 
light of a principle like the one proposed by Clifford implies a presupposi-
tion of atheism. A. Flew, for instance, proposes that “the debate about the 
existence of God should properly begin from the presumption of atheism, 
that the onus of proof must lie upon the theist.” (Flew 1976, 14).
Similarly M. Scriven says that
[a]theism is obligatory in the absence of any evidence for God’s existence. […] 
The proper alternative, where there is no evidence, is not mere suspension of 
belief, e.g. about Santa Claus; it is disbelief (Scriven 1966, 103). 
Once the belief in God was largely evaporated in the cultural and intel-
lectual discourse, many philosophers in the Lockean intellectual tradition 
considered atheism as the default position for any rational person. For 
this reason, theism is presumed to be guilty of irrationality or intellectual 
dishonesty as long as it is not proven innocent.
Intellectuals in the shadow of Kant, by contrast, were not so much con-
cerned with the ethics of religious belief than with its nature. They raise 
doubts about whether belief in God implies any belief about his existence. 
The most fundamental question of traditional metaphysics is “What is 
there?” As indicated above, however, Kantian metaphysics is an investi-
gation less of the external world and more of one’s mental concepts about 
that world. For Kant himself, God was not a possible item of our experi-
ence but rather a transcendental idea of theoretical reason, or a postulate 
of practical reason. Kaufman, for instance, in his influential book on the 
concept of God, distinguished between the real and the available referent 
of the term “God”, and argued that the real referent is never accessible to 
us because it transcends our experience. Thus, all we have is the available 
referent – a concept of God which is related in some important ways to our 
theoretical and in particular practical purposes (Kaufman 1972, 85).
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This was the intellectual situation in which analytic philosophers of 
religion found themselves in the 1960s and 1970s. Religious belief was no 
longer considered utterly meaningless, but the prevailing view was that 
there is no rational justification for religious beliefs or such beliefs are not 
claims about existence but rather about practical purposes and existential 
needs.
4. Adolescence: Arguing for the Rationality of Theistic Belief
The dominance of the evidentialist objection, however, began to crum-
ble in the second half of the 20th century. The epistemological discussion 
was in turmoil not least due to the contributions of figures like Kuhn and 
Feyerabend (Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend 1975).7 A meta-epistemological dis-
cussion emerged which made philosophers aware of various alternatives 
to foundationalism, which itself came to be seen as seriously flawed. One 
major objection to foundationalism is that most of the beliefs that we take 
for granted in our everyday life would not qualify for the foundation of 
a person’s belief system in the sense of being self-evident, incorrigible, 
or evident to the senses. Beliefs like “the world has existed for more than 
two hours”, “I had breakfast this morning”, “I am not the only person in 
the universe” or “There exist objects enduring through time” meet none of 
these criteria, even though we presuppose them in our daily life without 
invoking more basic beliefs to justify them. In other words, these beliefs 
seem to be properly basic, that is they can be justifiably held without other 
more basic beliefs, and a rational person seems to be justified in holding 
them – but foundationalism denies both of these claims. Another equally 
worrisome objection is that a principle of proper basicality, such as “Propo-
sition P is properly basic for person A only if P is self-evident or incorrigible 
or evident to the senses for A”, does not itself meet the conditions which 
it itself lays down. As a consequence, foundationalism is not free from 
7 Just think of the groundbreaking contributions to the philosophy of science and epis-
temology such as Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) and Paul 
Feyerabend’s Against Method (1975). 
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self-referential difficulties (Plantinga 1983, 59–63; Quinn 1985).8 Thus, 
foundationalism not only gives the wrong results, but it is also self-ref-
erentially incoherent. As long as foundationalism cannot overcome these 
problems, there is no obligation to stick to the foundationist’s claims that 
belief in God cannot be properly basic and that anyone believing in God 
without evidence that is in this sense sufficient is neglecting her epistemic 
duties as a rational person.
The breakdown of foundationalism as the leading epistemological the-
ory had further liberating effects for the development of the analytic phi-
losophy of religion. First, philosophers were exonerated of the obligation to 
demonstrate that religious belief is only justified if rationally grounded ac-
cording to a foundationalist model. Second, someone arguing that religious 
belief is irrational or epistemically unacceptable could no longer appeal 
to foundationalism to support his or her claim. The charge of irrationality 
against religious beliefs could no longer be launched from a dominating 
epistemological default position for all religious beliefs at once, but had to 
be made from a case by case basis. Third, the rejection of foundationalism 
led analytic philosophers of religion to investigate in what sense belief in 
God – if not based on other beliefs accepted by the neutral deliverance of 
reason – can be said to be basic and epistemically justified.
A major question in this context is: Does the claim that belief in God 
is properly basic imply that any belief whatsoever can be properly basic 
for a person?9 Plantinga and other religious epistemologists argued that 
there is no such implication, because criteria for proper basicality are to 
be developed inductively in the light of the circumstances of the believer 
(Plantinga 1983, 74–78).
One might worry that a failure to agree on the relevant circumstances 
will threaten the trap of foundationalism again – but this worry does not 
pan out. The arguments presented for the proper basicality of some belief 
8 For a detailed discussion of both points see Plantinga (1983), 59–63. Of course, Plantinga’s 
claims have not remainded without contradiction. See, for instance, Quinn (1985). 
9 For instance, imagine a great pumpkin or a spaghetti monster as suggested by some critics 
of the proper basicality of religious belief. 
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may in many cases be person-relative; that is, they may legitimately con-
vince one person within his or her specific circumstances even if they do 
not convince another person in another context (Mavrodes 1970, 31–35). 
Plantinga says:
The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and 
rational; […]. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray O’Hare may 
disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian 
community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community 
is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs (Plantinga 1983, 77).
Accordingly, a person can hold that belief in God is properly basic but that 
belief in the Great Pumpkin as creator of the universe is not – even though 
she lacks a clearly defined general criterion of proper basicality. Such a per-
son is not without any means, however, to defend his or her basic belief: 
Proper basicality does not imply an argumentative void. If a belief is prop-
erly basic in certain conditions (and not in others) then these conditions 
can also be the ground of the belief’s justification. The belief in God could 
be justified by the condition that human persons were created with a dis-
position to experience the creator’s presence in creation. Circumstances 
such as the experience of natural beauty, gratitude, inner peace, guilt or 
forgiveness may be used as grounds to justify the belief that God exists and 
discloses his existence to us.
To argue that a person is in his or her epistemic rights to have a basic 
belief in God does not imply that arguments cannot put into question this 
belief. The person may encounter strong arguments against the existence 
of God, such as the problem of evil or of divine hiddenness. These are po-
tential defeaters of the rationality of belief in God, and as a consequence 
this person needs an appropriate reply: a defeater-defeater, so to speak.
These brief reflections indicate that the line of thought put forward by 
Plantinga and cohorts, which is now known as “Reformed epistemology”, 
must not be conflated with strong forms of fideism. These see a tension 
between reason and faith; Reformed epistemology, by contrast, considers 
the belief in God to be a deliverance of reason in the same boat as the as-
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sumption that other persons exist or that objects endure through time. The 
claim is that God has created us in such a way that we form these beliefs 
rationally naturally if placed in the right circumstances. For this no “leap 
of faith” is required. Of course, an atheist can deny that belief in God is 
a deliverance of reason in the first place, but this objection leads us back 
to the initial claim that the neutral standpoint of philosophical reason 
presupposed by foundationalism is unavailable.
But not all proponents of analytic philosophical theology followed the 
lead of Reformed epistemology and have thought that the notion of a com-
mon neutral reason is per se problematic. Richard Swinburne, for instance, 
embraces the idea that there is in principle one common rational stand-
point available to theist and atheist alike. He does not think that the deliv-
erances of reason lead to rational certainty, but to the correct probability 
values for beliefs – including the belief in God. In his Intellectual Autobi-
ography, Swinburne explains how he came to endorse this view. He writes:
The world-view of the time [the 1950s, G. G.], however, then as now, among 
sophisticated intellectuals was basically anti-Christian. […] I was appalled by 
the fact that the Church didn’t seem to take seriously the claims and arguments 
of the current world-view (Swinburne 1994, 1). 
Subsequently he goes on:
[…] if the modern world throws up some plausible arguments which suggest 
that he [God, G. G.] almost certainly doesn’t exist, they need to be treated se-
riously and shown to be unsound (Swinburne 1994, 2). 
Finally he notes:
The centre-piece of the modern world-view was […] it seemed to me […] mod-
ern theoretical science […] which many people supposed to count against the 
traditional Christian world-view (Swinburne 1994, 4). 
These brief notes suffice for grasping the thrust of Swinburne’s line of 
argument. His starting point is the conception of neutral reason as used 
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in secular philosophy and the natural sciences. He accepts the criteria by 
which scientists judge a theory to be well supported and meaningful or 
ruled out by the data. Against this background, the claims of the Christian 
world-view require defense as rational and with a certain probability true.
Swinburne distinguishes between scientific and personal explanations, 
and he thinks that both kinds are used all the time to explain the phenome-
na we encounter. Scientific explanations appeal to an initial state of affairs 
together with natural laws to explain why a certain phenomenon takes 
place or will most probably take place. Personal explanations refer to the 
purposes and aims of a person to explain his or her behavior. In addition, 
Swinburne argues that there is a difference of “level” between these two 
kinds of explanations, on the one hand, and metaphysical theories, on the 
other. Scientific and personal explanations each seek to explain a limited 
class of data (“this specific observation” or “this kind of behavior”). Meta-
physical theories, in contrast, concern the highest level of explanation; they 
aim to be all-encompassing; that is, to explain the most general structures 
of reality, including what entities there are and how they relate to each 
other. With these distinctions to hand, Swinburne’s research program was
to use the criteria of modern natural science, analysed with the careful rigour 
of modern philosophy, to show the meaningfulness and justification of Chris-
tian theology (Swinburne 1994, 8). 
After working on confirmation theory for understanding the criteria by 
which scientists evaluate the quality of a theory, Swinburne began in the 
late 1970s to use this framework to put his research program into prac-
tice.10 In the Existence of God,11 Swinburne constructs a cumulative-case 
argument for God’s existence. His claim is that, in the light of various ob-
10 In a nutshell, the idea is that the intrinsic probability of a single proposition – its proba-
bility independently of any evidence – rests primarily on its simplicity; this probability is 
then modified in the light of evidence according to the probability calculus, in particular 
Bayes’s theorem. 
11 Swinburne (1979). This is the second book of his trilogy; the other two are The Coherence 
of Theism (1977) and Faith and Reason (1981). 
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servables such as the existence of a complex and ordered universe, the exis-
tence of conscious beings, the occurrence of certain apparently miraculous 
events in history and the widespread phenomenon of religious experience, 
theism is more probable than not.
5. Taking stock: An interim report
We are now in a position to take stock of the impact of these major de-
velopments in analytic philosophical theology that arose from the ashes 
of logical positivism in the two decades to follow. First, as outlined, the 
question of a rational justification of religious belief was in those days 
at center stage. The strategies for meeting this challenge were basically 
twofold: Either the assumption of a neutral conception of rationality as 
a common starting point was rejected as untenable, or it was accepted and 
used to argue that the existence of God is the most probable hypothesis 
to explain reality as we currently understand it. Though both accounts 
contrast sharply, they share the assumption – each in its own way – that 
a rational justification of religious belief is indispensable if philosophy of 
religion and systematic theology are to share a seat at the table of modern 
intellectual discourse. Both accounts hold that discourse about a belief 
system as large as what we might call one’s world-view is a matter open to 
rational evaluation and argument, not a question of non-rational choice, 
and thus that argumentative rigor and logical coherence are crucial in ar-
ticulating and upholding it.
Second, just as important as arguing for the rationality of religious 
belief per se is showing that various beliefs within areligious belief system 
can coherently be hold in the light of other beliefs about reality. Consid-
er, for instance, the problem of evil as a serious objection to a Christian 
world-view. In his classic article Evil and Omnipotence, J. L. Mackie claimed 
that the existence of God is logically inconsistent with the existence of 
evil. According to Mackie, his argument shows that “several parts of the 
essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another.” (Mackie 
1955, 200). 
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Thus, even if it could be shown that religious belief per se is rational, 
Mackie claims that it is ensnared in logical inconsistences once combined 
with other propositions in a larger doctrinal system. Consequently, we 
still need an argument to the effect that the various tenets of a religious 
world-view are not only consistent with each other but also with our other 
knowledge about the world.
Plantinga responded to Mackie’s challenge with what he called the 
“free will defense” (Plantinga, 1974, chap. IX). Without going into the in-
tricate details of the argument, Plantinga claimed that, possibly, it is not 
within the power of an omnipotent God to create a world containing moral 
goodness without moral evil. The reason for this is that moral goodness 
can only be achieved by creatures possessing libertarian free – but, as it 
happens, creatures with this sort of freedom will eventually choose evil 
instead of good. Hence, even in light of the existence of an omnipotent and 
wholly good God, evil in his creation will exist, and consequently Mackie’s 
argument of logical inconsistency fails. Similar discussions arose about 
other doctrines, such as God’s omniscience in relation to human freedom 
(Pike 1965).
Thus, the decades after the end of logical positivism witnessed not only 
a defense of religious belief per se but their defense against accusation of 
falsehood on grounds of logical inconsistency. Hasker underlines this point 
by saying that
[i]t was necessary for theists to define the main theistic attributes as rigorously 
as possible and to defend the definitions as logically coherent (Hasker 2005, 427). 
Accordingly, a discussion was taking shape, which continues today, about 
all of the attributes traditionally ascribed to God. The most prolific writer 
shaping this discussion is probably Swinburne. The following statement 
nicely summarizes the efforts that have been undertaken since then, by 
him and others:
The argument of Part II so far has been that it is coherent to suppose that 
there exists now an omnipotent spirit, who is perfectly free, the creator of the 
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universe, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and a source of moral obli-
gation – so long as ‘omnipotent’ and ‘omniscient’ are understood in somewhat 
restricted senses (Swinburne 1977, 217). 
Third, it ought to be underlined that, the removal of the obstacles to taking 
religious beliefs philosophically seriously was a necessary but by no means 
sufficient condition for the future development of analytic philosophical the-
ology. Once the door was wide open, also personalities are required willing to 
walk through. Swinburne was one such figure, Plantinga another. Telling in 
this context is Plantinga’s decision to leave Harvard for Calvin College in or-
der to continue to study philosophy with a confessing Christian philosopher:
Had I not returned to Calvin from Harvard, I doubt (humanly speaking, anyway) 
that I would have remained a Christian at all; certainly Christianity or theism 
would not have been the focal point of my adult intellectual life (Plantinga 
1993, 53). 
And in his well known 1984 presidential address to the Society of Chris-
tian Philosophers founded a few years earlier Plantinga reminds his fellow 
colleagues:
Christian philosophers, however, are the philosophers of the Christian com-
munity; and it is part of their task as Christian philosophers to serve the Chris-
tian community. But the Christian community has its own questions, its own 
concerns, its own topics for investigation, its own agenda and its own research 
program. Christian philosophers ought not merely take their inspiration from 
what’s going on at Princeton or Berkeley or Harvard, attractive and scintillat-
ing as that may be; for perhaps those questions and topics are not the ones, 
or not the only ones, they should be thinking about as the philosophers of the 
Christian community (Plantinga 1984). 
These excerpts suffice to give a feeling of the personal commitment of the 
first generation of analytic philosophers of religion to work in a Chris-
tian-philosophical spirit which was the crucial motor for the propagation of 
analytic philosophical theology as a serious object of philosophical study.
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Fourth, it should not be denied that the ambition to present a Christian 
world-view as a live intellectual option has corresponded with a rather pes-
simistic assessment of the state of modern theological reasoning. The most 
influential systematic theologians in the first two thirds of the 20th century 
were German, and their philosophical upbringing was mainly influenced 
by German Idealism, Phenomenology and philosophers such as Nietzsche, 
Heidegger or those in the French tradition. Analytic philosophers consider 
large portions of these philosophies with a certain reserve; for, as Swin-
burne remarks,
what characterizes them all is a certain sloppiness of argument, a tendency 
to draw big, vague general pictures of the Universe, without spelling out very 
precisely or justifying them very thoroughly, a kind of philosophy nearer to 
literature than to science (Swinburne 1994, 2). 
Now, one might claim that, sociologically speaking, the use of these crit-
icized philosophical resources was obvious for theologians at this time. 
If we focus on the eminent figures of 20th-century German speaking the-
ology such as Karl Barth, Karl Rahner or Wolfhart Pannenberg, we recog-
nize that they were educated within a lively philosophical culture shaped 
by world-renowned philosophers writing almost exclusively in German. 
Analytic philosophy, in contrast, was still in its early stage, primarily sci-
ence-oriented, largely hostile to religion and primarily an Anglo-American 
phenomenon. From this perspective it is rather a no-brainer for these theo-
logians to draw on the rich philosophical treasures of their own culture.
Be that as it may, the contemporary attitude of analytic philosophers 
of religion toward modern theology, as exemplified by Swinburne’s quote, 
is not primarily attributable to modern theologians’ neglect of analytic 
sources. Rather, the attitude points toward a more fundamental systematic 
question. As I have argued, the larger narrative of analytic philosophy in 
general included the search for a new firm foundation of knowledge. And 
the empiricist strand of this enterprise, at the very least, was deeply influ-
enced by the rise of modern natural science. Science was seen as a major 
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source of this sought-after foundation. Even if many contemporary analytic 
philosophers hold foundationalism to be untenable, they largely accept the 
theoretical exigencies of scientific accounts, including a realist outlook on 
reality, the assumption that truth is objective, and the emphasis on precise 
argumentation for each assertion.12
Many modern theologians, however, do not share these assumptions 
or priorities. On the one hand, one often encounters statements by theo-
logians to the effect that Kant has “shown” that we are unable to apply 
our concepts to reality itself, and therefore that we cannot apply them to 
God either. In other words, Kant is read as motivating a shift towards an 
anti-realist and anti-metaphysical mode of doing theology.13 On the other 
hand, many theologians are deeply influenced by so-called postmodernist 
thinking, which is highly critical of concepts such as universal science, 
truth or reason. The basic idea is that what counts as ‘true’ or ‘rational’ is 
a culturally and socially context-dependent story “told by persons in po-
sitions of power in order to perpetuate their way of seeing and organizing 
the natural and social world.” (Vanhoozer 2003, 11). 
On this view, philosophies subscribing to the ideal of objective truth 
and realist classificatory schemes reveal more – and something problem-
atic naïve – about their proponents than they do about the way things 
actually are or are supposed to be.
If this rough presentation of modern Western philosophy is correct, 
then two very distinctive streams of thought are present in this philosophy: 
one realist and the other anti-realist. Analytic philosophy belongs to the 
former camp, and philosophies inspired by figures such as Kant, Nietzsche, 
Heidegger or Derrida belong to the latter. I confine myself to noting that 
exponents of contemporary analytic philosophical theology consider these 
12 Rea (200), 4, characterizes the ambitions of analytic philosophy – which apply also to 
analytic philosophical theology – as follows: „(i) to identify the scope and limits of our 
powers to obtain knowledge oft he world, and (ii) to provide such true explanatory theo-
ries as we can in areas of inquiry (metaphysics, morals, and the like) that fall outside the 
scope of the natural sciences. 
13 Chignell (2009) argues that this is only one possible reading of Kant and there are other 
readings available which are more congenial to analytic thought. 
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postmodern maneuvers not only not their cup of tea but in fact a danger to 
systematic theology itself. William J. Abraham, a theologian sympathetic 
to analytic philosophical theology, for instance, writes:
In fact, the material content of systematic theology virtually disappeared in 
some quarters due to a Third Schism in the Church in which the canonical 
faith was deconstructed from within in the name of credibility and relevance. 
[…] The motives were good; theologians wanted to speak in a witting manner 
to the intellectual and political challenges of the day. The problem was that 
so little doctrinal content was left by the time the theologians were finished 
speaking. […] If the deep truths of the Gospel and the central elements of the 
Nicene Creed are constitutive of the Christian faith, then much modern and 
contemporary theology is really the invention of various forms of post-Chris-
tian religion (Abraham 2009, 57). 
This is one of the main worries motivating the work of advocates of ana-
lytic philosophical theology.
6. Maturity, and some brief objections
So far I have touched on topics such as the rationality of religious belief, 
the problem of evil and the divine attributes. All of these topics continue 
to be hotly debated, and these debates have led to further distinctions and 
more arguments. In addition, the topics treated have broadened consider-
ably: whereas the primary topic of discussion was theism in general, dis-
cussions now include increasingly specific (Christian) doctrines. Swinburne 
serves again as a paradigm case for this shift: After finishing his trilogy on 
theism in the early 1980s, he began to work on a series of books devoted to 
specific Christian doctrines such as the atonement, revelation, trinity, the 
incarnation and the resurrection in the 1990s.14
It is this time when the status nascendi of analytic theology ought to be 
located. As I have said, there is little point in trying to distinguish sharply 
14 A simple chronological ordering of Swinburne’s publications makes this shift in focus 
apparent. 
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between analytic philosophy of religion and analytic theology, particularly 
given the view, now shared by many analytic philosophers (and not just 
philosophers of religion), that there is no impetus – and possibly even no 
way – to base all of one’s arguments on neutral reason. We may charac-
terize analytic theology roughly as a theological model which draws on 
the resources of a particular philosophical tradition, analytic philosophy. 
As Crisp underlines, such a theological approach is “not intended as a ve-
hicle by which theology may become enslaved to philosophy. Instead, it 
is a means of making sense of substantive theological claims (as well as 
raising substantive issues).” (Crisp 2009, 42). 
Analytic theology is one proposed model of an account of faith seeking 
understanding – no more, but also no less. That said, I will now comment 
briefly on some objections raised against analytic philosophical theology 
as a method of this sort; I will conclude with a suggestion.
First Objection: analytic philosophical theology is a-historical: My ex-
position of the larger narrative in which analytic philosophical theology is 
embedded should have made clear that this objection is, at best, only par-
tially correct. As indicated, many analytic philosophers of religion certainly 
did pay attention to the history of philosophy. These philosophers saw 
themselves as part of a larger tradition influenced strongly by the ideals of 
the Enlightenment. As Wolterstorff has put it:
[…] the situation is not that we have failed to consider the Kantian alternative, 
and are consequently still wandering about in unenlightened naiveté; the situ-
ation is rather that we have considered the Kantian arguments and found them 
wanting (Wolterstorff 2010, 25).
In addition, many spear headers of this movement are also eminent his-
torians of philosophy. For instance, Eleonore Stump is a highly celebrated 
scholar of Aquinas, Marilyn McCord Adams of Ockham, and Woltertorff has 
written extensively on Locke and Thomas Reid.
This brings me to the second objection, which accuses analytic philo-
sophical theology of being a mere resumption of overcome scholasticism. 
Clearly, there is considerable overlap between analytic philosophical the-
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ology and scholastic thinking. The turn away from both Kant and post-
modern thinking makes analytic philosophical theology to a certain extent 
“pre-modern”, and consequently a methodological confederate of scholas-
ticism. Advocates of analytic philosophical theology see not only method-
ological parallels in the work of their medieval predecessors, but also many 
ideas worth considering. Since they do not share the wide-spread post-mod-
ern philosophical assumption of a “hermeneutics of suspicion”, they have 
no qualms in taking the ideas of the scholastics at face value in order to 
enter into a systematic philosophical dialogue with them. They are thus not 
resuming scholastic thought but mining it for valuable insights that can en-
rich the contemporary systematic philosophical and theological discourse.
Third objection: Analytic philosophical theology is hermeneutically 
blind. Having a clear look at the cultural and sociological factors shaping 
traditions of thought is valuable, and thus a “hermeneutics of suspicion” 
can thus be illuminating and helpful. There is no doubt that postmodern 
philosophy contributed enormously to creating a great sensibility to these 
issues, especially in correlation with topics such as tolerance, liberation and 
justice. There is a fundamental difference, however, between being aware of 
the helpfulness of such a hermeneutics and making it an absolute medium of 
interpretation. There is good reason to take the beliefs of others at their face 
value and to assess the quality of these beliefs as they stand because this 
implies to respect the claims of truth and rational adequacy put forward by 
those holding these beliefs. A “hermeneutics of suspicion” is useful as a me-
ta-tool once the honesty and communication goals of one’s dialogue partner 
are less than clear and thus make it reasonable to call them into question.
7. Concluding remarks
My primary aim in this paper has been to set out a larger narrative of an-
alytic philosophical theology, so as to better understand its research pro-
gram and the motivations guiding it. I close with a tentative prospect: 
In Analytic Theology Mike Rea gives voice to the hope that the method-
ological divide between analytic philosophers of religion and (postmod-
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ern-oriented) systematic theologians is ready to be explored (Rea 2009, 1). 
Indeed, this divide of traditions of thought is unfortunate because each 
can learn from another.
Analytic philosophical theology should take more seriously the worry 
that its own methodological approaches are subject to ideological abuse. 
The focus on religion’s ethical implications – such as its bearing on social 
and political issues – is almost entirely missing from the analytic perspec-
tive. In addition, the analytic tradition has always paid more attention to 
experience and the senses than to the interpretation of texts and narra-
tives. Major sources of religious life, however, are related to the reading of, 
or listening to the reading and expounding of, sacred texts. Here it might 
be helpful for analytic thinkers to learn from their continental counterparts 
who are more concerned about issues pertaining to hermeneutics, textual 
criticism and interpretation.
Finally, there is a tendency within analytic accounts, which develop 
increasingly specialized discussions, to narrow instead of broaden their 
focus. Paying more attention to other philosophical traditions – in partic-
ular to those that are compatible with the basic research assumptions of 
analytic thought15 – might be a useful remedy for a philosophical discus-
sion which gives the impression to study more and more of less and less.16
Thinkers in the so-called continental tradition, by contrast, show no 
particular sensibility to questions of rational adequacy and truth. This at-
titude is hardly comprehensible to someone who takes his or her own re-
ligious tradition as a serious live option for understanding reality and her 
existence in it. To such a person it matters enormously whether his or her 
religious beliefs are true or false. For if they are false, then all of the hopes 
built on it are in vain – as Paul famously underlines.17.
15 This may include phenomenological, pragmatist or process philosophical accounts, to 
name just a few, and exclude others such as extreme deconstructivist and psychoanalytic 
accounts. 
16 Stump (2010), chap. 2, criticizes this narrowness and accuses analytic philosophy of suf-
fering from cognitive hemianopia. She argues that it is largely blind to that part of reality 
“that includes the complex, nuanced thought, behavior, and relations of persons” (25). 
17 1 Cor 15, 13–14. 
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Analytic theology has the merit of focusing precisely on clarifying the 
contents of religious claims and evaluating the reasons for and against their 
truth. Of course, someone who is uninterested in these merits may find this 
methodological approach cumbersome and uncongenial. In this case, how-
ever, one might wonder in what alternative intellectual currency – if not 
precise and coherent argument – one might pursue a scholarly debate at all.
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